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Abstract
In the domain of entrepreneurship, mentors are considered as volunteers and philanthropists yet
their value is undermined, the purpose of this paper is to explore the feasibility of financial rewards for
mentors,  which could  help in  understanding the perspective of mentors towards the  opportunity cost
associated with mentoring.  This study uses a survey to explore the viability of different types of financial
reward models based on the responses of mentors engaged in the mentoring of entrepreneurs. The results
are  analysed  using  multivariate  techniques,  followed  by  post  hoc  analysis;  a  combination  of  both
approaches helps to increase the validity of findings in an exploratory study. The findings of this study
show that there is a need to restructure the mentoring system in the entrepreneurship domain, wherein the
findings reveal  that mentors are more professional  in today’s competitive business environment,  with
intentions to receive financial rewards for the long term showing a possible link between mentor growth
and the growth of mentees.  The pattern found in this study describes a new approach for mentoring in
entrepreneurship and for this reason more research is needed to confirm the emerging pattern underlined
in  this  research.  This  study is  first  of  its  kind  that  reviews  the  financial  opportunities  for  mentors,
especially in context of India, and develops groundwork for future empirical research in this area.
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Introduction
Rewards  have  remained  a  subject  of  criticism in  mentoring  (Moberg  and  Velasquez,  2004);
particularly financial rewards. A literature review by Hansford et al. (2002) has revealed a mixed response
on the importance of rewards;  some researchers found rewards motivating for mentoring while some
found them insignificant.  A study by Simon (1990)  showed that  self-motivated mentors  do not  seek
rewards out  of  mentoring but  some prefer  (mentors  as  investors)  rewards  as  the  source of  financial
benefits  (Cholakova  and  Clarysse,  2015).  Prior  investigations  have  also  argued  that  mentoring  is  a
philanthropic activity that requires a passion to mentor a less experienced individual (Lester et al., 2008;
Kram,  1985;  Sullivan,  2000)  whereas  financial  rewards  are  the  by-products  of  consultancy services
(Moberg and Velasquez, 2004). Thus, the preference for financial rewards has largely been suppressed
and, remained unexplored and undervalued in the literature. 
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However, unlike other domains such as teaching and sports, entrepreneurship involves a risk of
failure as it is a capital intensive sector. Sometimes, the capital is involved from both sides, mentee as
well as mentor. The complex economic environment may bring challenges to enterprise at any point for
which mentors need to be prepared, otherwise each stakeholder will have to face serious consequences.
Therefore, over the years, the bar of accountability has gone up for mentors. Additionally, a competitive
business environment and the governments’ complex business policies demand accountability in terms of
mentor time, space and investment. Due to this reason, the need for mentoring in entrepreneurship has
been changed which consequently changed the reward system too (Deaking et al., 1997; Allen et al.,
2000; Gimeno et al., 1997). 
Earlier, the rewards of mentoring used to be a special dinner by the mentee, thanks, respect, or an
increment in salary, and sometimes mentors were given opportunity to be the advisors to mentee’s firm
(Chun et al., 2012; Ragins and Scandura, 1999; Deakins et al., 1997). To this end, mentors have started
prioritizing  mentoring  more  than  before  as  it  could  bring  them economic  opportunities,  which  may
include financial  benefits  such as one-time payment,  incentives,  discounted stocks,  royalty and other
monetary rewards. 
Consequently, despite criticisms relating to financial rewards, they have become popular among
industries and start-ups for many reasons.  First, mentor interest in mentoring has been positively affected.
Second,  mentors  believe  that  they  have  created  competition  for  self,  and  that  such  belief  can  be
reasonably compensated.  Third,  start-ups  acquire  mentors  with  accountability. Fourth,  the  growth  of
mentors  is  ensured.  Fifth,  mentors’  time,  experience  and  expertise  have  been  compensated.  Sixth,
potential talented mentors are encouraged owing to the financial benefits. 
However, due to many pre-assumptions about the financial rewards, the topic remains under-
researched theoretically and empirically. In addition,  prior investigations have largely emphasised the
career development of mentees (Chrisman and McMullan, 2000) and the options for the development of
mentors have not been realised. By addressing these gaps, this paper examines the three types of financial
rewards models, preferred by the mentors for their development and growth. The framework of this paper
may be useful in designing mentor-mentee relationships in the entrepreneurship domain and linking the
mentor’s growth with the growth of the mentee. The findings of this paper help to inform the recruitment,
selection, training and retention of talented mentors organisations.
In the early part of this paper the available literature is reviewed, presenting the types of rewards
extended to mentors by their mentees, including both financial and non-financial rewards. The research
findings indicate the rewards preferred by mentors, followed by the duration and the percentage share of
rewards. Lastly, the key learning from the results are concluded and discussed. 
Literature Review
Viability of Rewards for Mentors
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Mentoring typically requires a time commitment of two to three years for the survival of start-ups
(Awasthi, 2011) and is mostly undertaken by those who thoroughly explore beforehand what the training
and subsequent career will be like in the process of developing entrepreneurs. Despite the criticism of
financial rewards, mentors are interested in such rewards for two reasons: first, financial rewards help in
developing  the  interest  of  mentors  in  mentoring.  Second,  the  experience,  expertise  and  time  are
compensated and thus they do not mind mentoring entrepreneurs from the same industry. This provides an
edge to mentors to decide why and whom they want to mentor. This divides mentors into two categories:
those who mentor for philanthropic reasons (e.g. they perceive that entrepreneurs need help); and others
who mentor with the perception that entrepreneurs will bring opportunities and greater rewards (Allen et
al., 2000). Simon (1990) explained above arguments and distinct behaviour of mentors depending upon
their personality. Simon added that there are two types of individuals: first, altruistic individuals who are
less disposed to assess personal costs and benefits, and hence most likely do not expect financial or any
other rewards from the mentees; these are more likely to help their mentees without the anticipation of
receiving benefits  in  return (Lester  et  al.,  2008;  Romer  et  al.,  1986).  On the contrary, low altruistic
mentors tend to be short of the inner drive to help mentees and are likely to be more sensitive to an
external environment that promotes or inhibits mentoring. Consequently, they perceive mentoring as a
source of opportunities and rewards. Thus, individuals may report both positive and negative experiences
in  the  same  relationship  (Duck,  1994).  For  example,  some  mentors  find  a  mentoring  relationship
generally rewarding (benefits), while some find difficulty in relating it interpersonally with the mentees
(cost or entry barrier). Therefore, mentoring the mentees who need help, may also bring rewards to the
mentors but different than those brought from mentees who have strong ability or potential. For instance,
a reward can be intrinsic satisfaction for altruistic mentors (Allen et al., 2000). Entry barriers on the other
hand, such as risk of failure of the mentees may bring negative rewards to the mentors; for example,
mentors  may suffer  embarrassment  if  mentees  fail  (Halatin  and Knotts,  1982;  Ragins  and Scandura,
1994). Following this argument, Olian et al. (1993) found that mentors anticipate greater rewards and are
more willing to mentor higher performing mentees than lower performing so that they may avoid negative
aspects of mentoring. Social exchange theory elucidates these arguments more elaborately; it explains that
negative experiences are distinct aspects of a relationship rather than simply lack of benefits (Sprecher,
1992; Thibaut and Kelley, 1959). For instance, previous studies found that mentors felt pressurised by the
mentoring process (Scandura and Williams, 2002), and they believe that their participation will hinder
other responsibilities, causing a decline in output and performance-based activities (Allen and Eby, 2003).
By  and  large,  entrepreneurship  mentoring  has  always  been  associated  with  non-financial/financial
rewards and it is hard to isolate a capital and risk-intensive sector from financial rewards. In recent years,
industry and start-ups have started compensating their mentors by sharing stocks and board members’
designations and snubbed any possibility of completely free mentoring. Allen et al. (2000) found that
commitment in terms of time invested in mentoring provokes mentor’s interest in mentoring and can
depend upon the rewards mentors receives (Scandura, 1992; Eby and McManus, 2004).
Rewards in University-Led Mentoring Programmes
About  1400  years  ago,  Chanakya  (350–275  BC)  mentored  Chandrgupta.  Chanakya  was  the
eminent faculty of Taxila University, India. He helped Chandragupta to become the emperor of India.
Chanakya  was  compensated  by  receiving  the  designation  of  the  Prime  Minister  (Mabbett,  1964).
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Similarly,  in  today’s  business  environment,  successful  entrepreneurs  like  Sanjeev  Bikhchandani of
Naukri.com, is known for sharing monetary rewards with his mentors. Outside the premises of university,
financial rewards are available in the form of prize money, consulting fees and honorarium for speaking. 
Universities  collaborate  with  industries  for  Research  and  Development  and  help  in
commercializing the patents. In return, they receive stocks or royalty depending on the products (Stephan
and Levin, 1996). Similarly, within Incubation Centres, professors as mentors help start-ups in research,
commercialization, selling/marketing, human resource and the areas in which mentees need expertise.
Incubation Centres receive shareholding as financial rewards and sometimes mentors become director and
advisors  of  their  mentee’s enterprise.  For  example,  the  Incubation  Centre  at  the  Indian  Institute  of
Technology Delhi, India, follows the same model. Within India, academic mentors (mostly professors)
typically support their mentoring programmes, or entrepreneurship development programmes, through
government grants. In recent years, however, obtaining funding has become substantially easier with the
‘Made  in  India’  concept,  while  the  number  of  applicants  and  cost  of  programme  has  increased
dramatically, and the procedure to support entrepreneurs through banks and funding agencies has become
sound as compared to that of post-independence era. As the competition for grants has increased, Indian
mentors have become increasingly entrepreneurial and competitive. They are required to hone up their
skill to carry out business proposals.  They have become accustomed to seeking or renewing funding.
Additionally, they have  had  to  seek  alternative  sources  to  develop  entrepreneurs.  It  is  therefore  not
surprising that today’s mentors are more receptive to the idea of financial rewards than mentors of an
earlier era. The increased accountability out of competition has led them to think for their own interests
too. Consequently, faculty as mentor receives rewards in terms of monthly remuneration, directorship
position, board membership, and a stake in the company, among other things. Such practices have been
transferred  by Western  to  Eastern  countries.  Institutional  mentorship  models  such  as  ‘Massachusetts
Institute of Technology Venture Mentoring Service’ (MIT VMS) and ‘Oxford Business Mentoring’ claim
that  they do not  expect  anything from the mentee and their  programmes run through sponsorship of
partner companies or by donations. During the fiscal year 2013 (July 1, 2012 to June 30, 2013),  MIT
VMS  received  financial  support  in  the  form of  donation  from 98  entrepreneurs.  Similarly,  Oxford
Business Mentoring states: “The core administration is funded generously by Jennings, and mentors do
their own follow-up paperwork. For marketing, publicity and any other advice, we pull in favours from
our business and mentoring network. For example, the logo was designed by one of our mentors, and the
website created by one of our clients. We sometimes are given funding and welcome it.”
Babson College describe their  experience as follows: “Babson is  sustained and strengthened
each year by the financial contributions of thousands of alumni, students, families, faculty, staff, friends,
corporations, and organizations. Donor support provides for financial aid, exceptional faculty, trademark
academic  centres,  cutting-edge  research  initiatives,  and  an  innovative,  hands-on  entrepreneurship
curriculum”.  Though the possibility of  financial  rewards  to  mentors  is  unclear  and ambiguous,  it  is
imperative to understand that financial support is required for the survival of mentoring programmes. 
Reward Models in Formal Mentoring Programmes
Entrepreneurs have benefited from mentoring support; they have made profits and created wealth
for their generations. They have not only managed to survive, but also succeeded in creating multiple
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ventures. On the contrary, the primary rewards to mentors were appreciations,  reorganisation,  special
dinners, salary, and fixed fee. Mentors began to realise that they could capture more tangible rewards by
engaging themselves in mentees’ firms and consequently, they started gaining positions like directorship
or advisorship in their mentees’ firms. They would no longer have to wait for the rewards offered by
mentees; they could negotiate beforehand. Various ways have evolved for mentors to capture monetary
rewards. In many instances, mentors share the percentage of royalties, stock options, discounted stocks,
and percentage share in turnover or profit. Such financial reward models are prevalent between scientists
and universities  when they collaborate  for  commercializing the research (Stephen and Levin,  1996);
however, it is a simple case of knowledge transfer, and mentoring is limited to conducting research and
guidance only. In other instances, the financial rewards are popular between investors, venture capitalist,
franchising, and start-ups. In crowd-funding, for example, investors share financial rewards in terms of
equity and revenue with entrepreneurs (Cholakova and Clarysse, 2015). In India, investors also mentor
the start-ups they invest in. Sharad Sharma, former CEO of Yahoo! India, invested in more than 10 start-
ups and is actively involved in their mentoring. A case could be made that financial rewards are necessary
in order to attract talented persons into mentoring.
Financial Rewards Harm the Spirit of Mentoring?
Expectation of reward has been the subject of debatem in the mentoring literature. Researchers
have argued that mentoring has to be voluntary (Moberg and Velasquez, 2004). Previous studies have
shown a  mixed  response  on  the  same  subject;  some  have  demonstrated  the  importance  of  rewards,
specifically financial rewards such as fees, incentives, and  increased salaries that are mostly associated
with mentoring other than entrepreneurial activities, whereas profit, equity and inclusion of a mentor on
the board (directorship,  advisory)  are prominent  in entrepreneurial  mentoring.  In support  of  financial
rewards to mentors, the study argues that entrepreneurship is a risk- and capital-intensive sector; it raises
the  accountability  of  mentors,  which  requires  commitment  and  motivation  to  handle  the  potential
entrepreneurs.  Therefore,  rewards  are  essential  for  mentors  to  compensate  their  time,  experience and
expertise as well as to shape their future. Researchers found that financial rewards in terms of increased
salary, bonus, a percentage of royalties / turnover / profit, stock options, discounted stocks, and incentives
can be sources of motivation to mentor (Gibb, 1999; Stephen and Levin, 1996; Cholakova and Clarysse,
2015). Therefore, theoretically within entrepreneurial mentoring, financial rewards are viable and do not
harm the passion of mentoring entrepreneurs; they only motivate mentors to undertake mentorship with
increased accountability. 
Research Methodology
From the above background, it  has been substantiated that theoretically financial rewards are
viable in entrepreneurial mentoring. However, empirically the same needs to be tested. This study aims at
exploring  the  financial  rewards  models  for  mentors  and  investigates  their  feasibility  based  on  the
background of mentors. The rationale behind conducting this research is to develop a basic understanding
towards the extension of financial rewards to mentors, which is lacking in the literature. An exploratory
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design  was  chosen  to  investigate  the  relationship  among  variables  and in  continuation  to  it,  profile
variables (e.g. age) have been examined with the financial reward models, so that groundwork may be
developed. The models were developed through in-depth interviews with mentors. A questionnaire was
developed informed by the interviews and administered for the survey. 
Sample
The mentors are registered with government and academic organisations. All the organizations
are  nationally  recognized  for  providing  entrepreneurial  mentoring  support  to  SMEs,  potential
entrepreneurs  and  start-ups.  Other  than  these  organizations,  data  was  collected  from
professors/experts/mentors/trainers/entrepreneurs  from  various  academic  institutions  and  government
agencies  involved in  providing  mentoring  and supported  by Department  of  Science  and Technology
(DST),  Government  of  India.  In  order  to  explore  the  financial  models,  in-depth  interviews  were
conducted. Based on the suggestions received, a questionnaire was administered for survey. The mentors
were contacted by an electronic mail. A request for an interview and survey was made to them, either over
the telephone or face-to-face. They were requested to participate only if they had mentored entrepreneurs.
Most mentors provided their mobile number through an email. A total number of 10 male mentors were
interviewed for minimum 20 minutes and maximum 60 minutes. Their brief profile is given in Table 1.
For survey, after confirmation through an email, the invitation to participate in survey was sent out to
mentors via Google form, which solicited their participation directly. The survey reached 400 mentors, of
which 104 returned a completed survey, thereby resulting in a 26% response rate. The mean age of the
mentors was 45.73 and all were male.
Measures: Financial Reward Models
Due to limited research and lack of conceptual framework of the construct, the three types of
models viz. Profit, Turnover and Royalty Share were conceptualized and operationalized using 5-point
Likert-Type Scale. The questions related to each reward had a single item, with five options (Krueger et
al., 2000; Peterman and Kennedy, 2003; Veciana et al. 2005; Kolvereid and Isaksen, 2006). The options
were coded from 1 to 5, each with option corresponding to a range of percentage. In order to conduct
further analysis, the mean of the range was calculated and the range was transformed into a metric scale.
Additionally, yes/no questions were also included to form categorical variables. Respondents were asked
about the feasibility of all the three financial reward variables,  the  percentage of reward share and the
time duration for which the reward is to be shared.
Occupation Frequency
Entrepreneur 3
Professor 2
Consultant 2
Head of Entrepreneurship Center/ Department 3
Professional Experience Frequency
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Less than 10 years 2
11-20 years 4
Over 20 years 4
Mentored Frequency
Yes 10
Rewards
Other 0
High respect 3
Special dinner 1
Advisor/ Directorship in mentee's firm 3
Fees 1
Stocks 2
Total 10
Financial Rewards Worthwhile
No 2
Yes 8
Table 1: Profile of Mentors for Interview
Results
The  survey data  were  collected  over  a  period  of  four  weeks.  In  order  to  analyse  the  data,
descriptive statics and one-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) has been used in SPSS
version 20. The three reward variables relating to financial reward models were combined in MANOVA
as  dependent  variables.  All  the  three  variables  were  analysed  in  conjunction  with  the  parameters
(category-independent  variables)  and  classified  for  mentors  i.e.  age,  professional  experience,  and
occupation. As the present research is exploratory in nature, we explored all the possible outcomes, and
hence, through MANOVA, all the three reward variables were investigated with each of the independent
variables.  Table  2  shows the  descriptive  statistics  for  the  reward  models  in  terms  of  frequency and
percentage. The time duration for which mentors intend to receive rewards, is also calculated using mean
and standard deviation. 
Code Percentage Share Profit Turnover Royalty
Frequenc
y
Percentag
e
Frequenc
y
Percentag
e
Frequenc
y
Percentag
e
1 .1% to .5 % 5 4.8 14 13.5 8 7.7
2 .5% to 1 % 8 7.7 15 14.4 12 11.5
3 1% to 2.5 % 33 31.7 33 31.7 24 23.1
4 2.5% to 5 % 38 36.5 23 22.1 44 42.3
5 More than 5% 20 19.2 19 18.3 16 15.4
Total 104 100 104 100 104 100
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Mode 4 3 4
Mean 3.58 (SD=1.040) 3.17 (SD=1.273) 3.46 (SD=1.123)
Rewards Share (Years)
Mean
4.58 (SD=1.978) 4.08 (SD=1.974) 4.47 (SD=1.942)
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Reward Models
The three types  of  rewards were categorized into a range of  percentage share.  For  example,
whether mentors think that 2.5% to 5% of the total profit is reasonable to be extended to mentor or 1% to
2.5 % of the total turnover is reasonable to be extended to mentors. Moreover, the percentage of share
may be extended for nearly four years. In Table 2, the increasing order of range does not imply that 2.5%
is greater  than 0.5%; however, the respondents were asked to choose the reasonable and appropriate
option according to their estimation, which may be based upon their experience of mentoring relations,
current  competition  and  future  prospects.  Therefore,  the  respondents  anticipating  the  nature  and
complexity of the relationship chose the most feasible range. The value of mode for profit  share and
royalty share was 4, which means that mentors prefer to share 2.5% to 5 % of the profit and royalty,
whereas the mode for turnover share is  3,  which indicates that  they prefer to share anything ranged
between 1% to 2.5 % of the turnover.
Reward Models 
All the three reward variables were analysed with the profile of mentors. For this purpose, the
mean of range 0.1% to 0.5 %, 0.5% to 1 %, 1% to 2.5 %, 2.5% to 5 % was calculated as 0.3, 0.75, 1.75,
3.75, and 7.5, respectively. MANOVA for the three parameters for mentors’ profile, i.e. age, professional
experience and occupation, was calculated (Table 3); Pillai's Trace test statistic was used to calculate the
significance value, as this method is robust when cell sizes are unequal.  The F-values for the following
relationships are insignificant: (1) professional experience and reward variables and, (2) occupation and
reward variables. However, F-value is significant for (1) age level and reward variables; Pillai's Trace =
0.149, F (6, 200) = 2.690, p = 0.016, η2= 0.075. The partial eta squared (η2) of region is 7.5%. In order to
examine the further differences in categories a Post Hoc test was conducted as shown in Tables 4 and 5.
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Descriptive Statistics Multivariate  Tests
(MANOVA) Pillai's Trace
Age level Mean Std.
Deviation
N F Hypothesis
df
Sig
Profit Share Less  than  40
years 3.1154 1.76243
26
2.690 6.000 .016
40-60 years 3.8385 2.39320 65
Above  60
years 3.4231 1.54578 13
Total   3.6058 2.16568 104
Turnover
Share
Less  than  40
years 1.9038 .88056 26
40-60 years 3.4308 2.47271 65
Above  60
years 3.8269 2.64848 13
Total 3.0986 2.30249 104
Royalty Share Less  than  40
years 3.7885 1.83534 26
40-60 years 4.0731 1.81127 65
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Above  60
years
2.9808 1.01274 13
Total 3.8654 1.76155 104
Professional Experience
Profit Share Less than 10 3.1818 1.79873 33 1.962 6.000 .073
Less than 20 3.7340 2.33441 47
More than 20 3.9375 2.27970 24
Total 3.6058 2.16568 104
Turnover
Share
Less than 10 2.2879 1.36376 33
Less than 20 3.4096 2.60561 47
More than 20 3.6042 2.48355 24
Total 3.0986 2.30249 104
Royalty Share Less than 10 3.8939 1.74668 33
Less than 20 4.1649 1.91410 47
More than 20 3.2396 1.31562 24
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Total 3.8654 1.76155 104
Occupation
Profit Share Entrepreneur 3.5738 2.14007 61 1.368 9.000 .202
Professor 2.9559 1.97491 17
Consultant 4.5962 2.13975 13
Govt. Trainer 3.6154 2.43160 13
Total 3.6058 2.16568 104
Turnover
Share
Entrepreneur 2.7172 2.08340 61
Professor 3.1912 2.02818 17
Consultant 3.5385 2.40842 13
Govt. Trainer 4.3269 3.14971 13
Total 3.0986 2.30249 104
Royalty Share Entrepreneur 3.7459 1.80075 61
Professor 4.2941 1.60379 17
Consultant 3.5769 1.46268 13
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Govt. Trainer 4.1538 2.08301 13
Total 3.8654 1.76155 104
Table 3: Distribution of Reward Variables
Post Hoc Test for Age Level and Reward Models
In Table 3, a significant difference was observed from MANOVA. The value of Pillai’s Trace is
0.149, p=0.033; it implies that there exists at least one significant difference between the mean scores of
the categories of independent variable for the dependent variables. In order to see which category of
independent variable has significant difference, the Welch test was performed for each variable (Table 4).
Furthermore,  Post  Hoc  analysis  was  conducted  using  the  Games-Howell  method;  this  test  is  robust
enough to provide reliable results when equal variances are not assumed.
Dependent Variable Statistic
s
df
1
df2 Sig.
Profit share 1.261 2 36.17
8
.
295
Turnover share 11.310 2
29.98
3
.
000
Royalty share 4.594 2 38.53
0
.
016
Table 4: Welch Tests Age Level & Reward Variables
From the above Welch Table 4, it can be inferred that the values of the turnover share and royalty
share are significant at p = 0.000 and p = 0.016, respectively. It implies that the age of mentors is a
significant predictor of the types of rewards that can be shared with mentors, and consequently, in terms
of age, they prefer to share a percentage part in turnover and royalty. Furthermore, micro analysis of the
turnover share reveals that the younger mentors (below 40 years of age) and middle-aged mentors of
(between 40–60 years of age) have significant difference in the respective mean scores (refer Table 3). It
implies that mentors aged 40–60 years (mean = 3.4) are more inclined for the turnover share than mentors
below 40 years of age (Mean = 1.9). In addition, mentors aged 40-60 years and above 60 years have
significant difference in royalty share category (mean difference = 0.35968), refer Table 5. Overall, it
implies that mentors aged 40–60 years are more inclined to financial rewards, whether it is turnover or
royalty share.
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Depend
ent
variable
(i)  Age
level
(j) Age level Mean
difference
(i-j)
Std.
Error
Sig. 95%  confidence
interval
Lower
bound
Upper
bound
Profit
Share Less
than  40
years
40-60 years -.7231 .45561 .259 -1.8170 .3709
Above 60 years -.3077 .55070 .843 -1.6726 1.0573
40-60
years 
Less than 40 years .7231 .45561 .259 -.3709 1.8170
Above 60 years .4154 .52146 .709 -.8829 1.7137
Above
60 years
Less than 40 years .3077 .55070 .843 -1.0573 1.6726
40-60 years -.4154 .52146 .709 -1.7137 .8829
Turnove
r Share 
Less
than  40
years
40-60 years -1.5269* .35198 .000 -2.3660 -.6879
Above 60 years -1.9231 .75458 .058 -3.9092 .0630
40-60
years 
Less than 40 years 1.5269* .35198 .
000
.6879 2.3660
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Above 60 years -.3962 .79601 .873 -2.4445 1.6522
Above
60 years
Less than 40 years 1.9231 .75458 .058 -.0630 3.9092
40-60 years .3962 .79601 .873 -1.6522 2.4445
Royalty
Share Less
than  40
years
40-60 years -.2846 .42430 .782 -1.3125 .7433
Above 60 years .8077 .45657 .194 -.3076 1.9230
40-60
years 
Less than 40 years .2846 .42430 .782 -.7433 1.3125
Above 60 years 1.0923* .35968 .013 .2056 1.9791
Above
60 years
Less than 40 years -.8077 .45657 .194 -1.9230 .3076
40-60 years -1.0923* .35968 .013 -1.9791 -.2056
Table 5: Table Games-Howell Multiple Comparisons for Age Level and Reward Models
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level
Discussion
In this paper, a multivariate technique was used to arrive at the results. There are six important
findings of this exploratory research. First, descriptive statistics suggested that mentors prefer turnover
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share and royalty share. Second, the intended time duration for sharing the reward for the mentors is
approximately four years. Third, mentors are likely to prefer a percentage of reward in range of 2.5% and
5% for both types of rewards. Fourth, the age level of mentors has significant impact on turnover and
royalty reward share.  Fifth,  experience and occupation are insignificant  in  predicting the viability of
rewards; this finding is not in-line with previous findings where experience is correlated with the cost and
the benefits  of being a mentor (Ragins and Scandura, 1999). Sixth, the age-level  of mentors plays a
significant role in understanding the reward system for existing mentors. The mentors in the age group of
40–60 years are likely to be more inclined to prefer these models. Therefore, based on above results, the
present research proposes a financial reward model for mentors, Figure 1.
Figure 1: Reward Model for Mentors
Conclusion 
In  this  paper,  the  financial  rewards  for  mentors  in  the  entrepreneurship  domain  have  been
examined to provide a basic understanding for extending the financial rewards to mentors by mentees.  It
has been found that mentors in entrepreneurship are willing to receive financial rewards, unlike traditional
mentors who considered mentoring to be only a philanthropic activity (Moberg and Velasquez, 2004).
Results  show that  experience and occupation are insignificant  in predicting the rewards for mentors,
whereas age level is a significant predictor of rewards. It has been investigated that mentors falling into
the age group of 40–60 years are more eager to share a percentage of turnover and royalty as reward. As
mentors seem to be profoundly motivated by the idea of financial rewards, extending the same to mentors
can be an effective new strategy for engaging talented and accountable mentors in the mentorship of
entrepreneurs. As pointed out by Sullivan (2000), mentors provide life-long benefits to entrepreneurs and
provide mentoring at any given point of need, therefore they must be rewarded from a policy perspective.
The present research also suggests that the reward-system for mentors is experiencing a transition
from intangible rewards (Halatin and Knotts, 1982) to tangible rewards (Gibb, 1999; Stephan and Levin,
1996) and researchers have found that psychological rewards are not sufficient to motivate individuals to
pursue their job (Stephan and Levin, 1996). Hence, without ignoring the importance of intangible motives
like passion for mentoring and helping others, this research suggests that future rewards could include a
package of  financial  as  well  as  non-financial  rewards  for  successful  mentoring.  Such packages may
positively affect the motivation level of mentors for mentoring (Gimeno et al., 1997). The importance of
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financial  rewards  along  with  non-financial  rewards  has  also  been  acknowledged  in  other  areas  of
entrepreneurship (Cholakova and Clarysse, 2015). 
It has also been noted that the available literature does touch upon intangible rewards, but not on
financial rewards. The probable reasons include: i) most of the mentoring studies are conducted from the
perspective of the  mentees  (Hansford et  al.,  2002);  ii)  mentors are considered as volunteers and not
professionals (Moberg and Velasquez, 2004); iii) mentoring for entrepreneurs is mostly undertaken by
government agencies (either free of cost or limited fee paid to mentor); iv) the lack of supportive culture
to paid mentoring;  v)  most  of  the mentoring studies are conducted in the US, the UK, Canada,  and
Australia (Hansford et al., 2002). Therefore, little is known about the situation in developing countries
like India. The present study helps in exploring and understanding the importance of financial rewards
from the perspective of mentors.
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first of its kind in this area. The perspectives of
mentors from industry, academia, and government-supported agencies have been investigated and this
could further be narrowed down to any specific sector providing scope for future research. Though the
findings  of  the  present  study  are  novel  and  contribute  to  the  literature  on  mentorship  and
entrepreneurship, very little evidence from the extant literature was available to support the findings of
the study. Whilst  this  study suggests exploring the viability of financial  rewards in the mentoring of
entrepreneurship, there are opportunities to explore the other sectors as well. As this was a study with all-
male  participants,  there  are  also opportunities  to  explore  these questions  using an alternative gender
balance. 
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